Proving Least Privilege with Denial Tests
Least privilege is not proved by showing that approved work succeeds. It is proved by testing the nearby actions, resources, identities, and conditions that policy must deny.
security made simple
Least privilege is not proved by showing that approved work succeeds. It is proved by testing the nearby actions, resources, identities, and conditions that policy must deny.
An architecture review earns its cost only when it produces an explicit decision, bounded conditions, accountable owners, verification criteria, and a durable record.
A conversation with Rich from 2GuysTek about the Cybersecurity Architect's Handbook, the fundamentals that still matter, and how architects should approach AI, zero trust, quantum readiness, and legacy systems.
Seeing a well-read copy of Cybersecurity Architect’s Handbook, Second Edition out in the wild never gets old.
Least privilege is not proved by showing that approved work succeeds. It is proved by testing the nearby actions, resources, identities, and conditions that policy must deny.
An architecture review earns its cost only when it produces an explicit decision, bounded conditions, accountable owners, verification criteria, and a durable record.
A practical skills checklist for building a personal VM lab, testing what you know, collecting evidence, and recovering from your own mistakes.
Decommissioning is the controlled removal of authority, dependencies, identities, and startup paths, not a power-off event.
A completed backup proves data was written somewhere. Recovery evidence proves the right service can be restored safely, within its objective, without colliding with production.
A practical baseline for governing AI authority, data, tools, consequential actions, evidence, and lifecycle risk without mistaking a system prompt for a security boundary.
A conversation with Rich from 2GuysTek about the Cybersecurity Architect's Handbook, the fundamentals that still matter, and how architects should approach AI, zero trust, quantum readiness, and legacy systems.
A useful threat model tracks live trust boundaries, administration paths, transition states, recovery systems, evidence dates, and the changes that made the old model wrong.